The Subjectivist principle was originally part of Hume’s “sensationalist doctrine,” which was composed of the “subjectivist principle” and the “sensationalist principle.” The subjectivist principle states that “the datum in the act of experience can be adequately analyzed purely in terms of universals.” Whitehead rejects this subjectivist principle on several accounts by rejecting the premises upon which the subjectivity principle is built.

 

        The first premise is that the “ultimate ontological principle” is expressed by the substance-quality concept. Whitehead sees this idea as tracing back to ancient Greek philosophical thought in which it was believed that the entire world can be understood as “a collection of primary substances qualified by universal qualities.” However, for Whitehead, neither particular substance nor universal quality holds ontological primacy. In the same way that Democritus conceived the world as being comprised of microcosmic atoms, Whitehead understood the world to be composed of microcosmic units he calls Actual Entities. Unlike Democritus (and later Aristotle), Whitehead’s microcosmic units (Actual Entities) are not substances but “units of process.” This basic building block of reality is “the unity to be ascribed to a particular instance of concrescence.” Concrescence is the growing together of expiring processes of the immediate past into a becoming present. Since processes, rather than “qualities inhering in a subject,” are the foundation of reality, the substance-quality concept cannot express the ultimate ontological principle.

 

        The second premise of the subjectivist principle is that a primary substance is always a subject and never a predicate. Whitehead sees this way of describing reality as highly abstract and not very useful in constructing metaphysics. Another difficulty Whitehead has with this view is that subject-predicate propositions cannot speak meaningfully about the relation and interaction between the substances, but only about isolated substances and their qualities. Whitehead’s philosophy of organism seeks to speak concretely and meaningfully about the real relation between actual entities in their prehension of every other actual entity.

 

    Together, these two principles form the foundation for distinguishing between universals and particulars. Whitehead considers the sharp distinction and mutual inclusion of universals and particulars to be a significant blunder in the history of philosophy. He sees ‘particulars’ as a misdescription of Actual Entities and ‘universals’ as a misdescription of Eternal Objects. There cannot be a sharp distinction between particulars and universals: “every so-called ‘universal’ is particular in the sense of being just what it is, diverse from everything else; and every so-called ‘particular’ is universal in the sense of entering into the constitution of other entities.” Because every  “particular” Actual Entity becomes part of the constitution of other Actual Entities, no Actual Entity can adequately be described by universals. Other Actual Entities must become predicates to describe every subjectival Actual Entity.

 

     Though rejecting Hume’s subjectivist principle, he does accept a reformed subjectivist principle that follows from Descartes’ subjectivist bias. Descartes expressed that the subjective experience is the central source of data for understanding metaphysics. Whitehead accepts this subjectivist bias (which followed in a sense from the subjectivist principle) but transforms it not only to refer to the material for philosophical reflection, but also the nature of reality. This subjectivity is not merely in the consciousness of the subject, but in the prehension of every actual entity experienced. In the subjectivity of the observer, not only are universals or mental constructs (judgements) encountered, but the Actual Entities themselves are part of the datum of experience. For Whitehead, this datum is not merely actively observed, but is passively received as a Conformal Feeling in the initial phase of Concresence. Hence, Whitehead summarizes the Reformed Subjectivist Principle as “merely an alternative statement of the principle of relativity,” in that “it belongs to the nature of a ‘being’ that it is a potential for every ‘becoming.”

The subjectivist principle is very suggestive for the theological enterprise. It speaks significantly regarding the interconnectedness and interrelatedness of all things. If being itself is to be potential becoming, this means that the result of every event has unfolding ramifications in its prehension in successive cycles of concresence. Rather than understanding substances or events individualistically or in an isolated manner, reality has a social constitution. This is because every entity is conditioned by its environmental relations and the data which each entity perceives in its environment becomes constitutive for it as it prehends them. Thus no thing microcosmically or macrocosmically exists as itself and unto itself. All being is based on relatedness in the subjective immediacy each entity enjoys with others.

 

    The reality of inter-relatedness has much to contribute to the doctrine of sin. Sin is often conceived of individualistically in terms of the sinner’s rebellion against God. The problem with sin is the infinite degree to which it is an assault on God’s honor. According to this understanding of sin, God’s atonement for the sin of the world has nothing to do with the effects of that sin on the created order, nor the order of justice and integrity within creation, but only the order of justice between the lord and the servant. A process understanding of sin would emphasize the interconnectedness of all things, so that every action of every individual finds its objectification in subsequent entities. Every action and decision influences the actual world for every subsequent entity in contributing data for the receptive phase of concrescence. Hence there is no such thing as “individual” or “private” sin. All actions do affect others and all actions must be viewed in light of their affects upon others. This social understanding of sin seems to fit with the scriptural testimony better than the individualistic understanding. Even from the beginning, in Genesis three, sin is a social event and has social ramifications. The results of sin are alienation from God (Gen. 3.8ff, 23ff.), alienation of humans from each other (Gen. 3.7, 11-12), alienation between women and men (Gen. 3.16) and alienation between humans and the nature (Gen. 3.17-19). Furthermore, the summary of the law is to love (Matt. 22.34ff; John 13.34; Rom. 13.8ff; 1 John 3.11; 4.7), which is a social reality. It follows that God’s concern over the transgression of the law would correlate with the nature of the law (love, sociality, relationship) and not simply the abstraction of obedience-disobedience.

 

    The “problem of evil” is usually framed somewhat as follows: If God is all-powerful and all good, from where does evil come? If God is all-powerful then he has the ability to stop suffering and evil. If he is all good, then he would desire to do so. Nevertheless, evil certainly exists. The problems takes on a different angle depending on whether one is using the problem of evil to disprove the existence of God, or if one is wrestling with it in context to theistic belief. Process theism would respond to the problem of evil by saying that classical Christian conceptions of the omnipotence of God are flawed. In process metaphysics, all entities maintain some dimension of freedom. No entity has the power to completely influence or determine another. God is not an exception. Griffin speaks of what he calls the “omnipotence fallacy.” This is the idea that if a logically possible state could be conceived, an omnipotent being could bring it into existence single-handedly. A simple example that shows this to not be the case is the idea of a contract or agreement (and by extension the biblical concept of covenant). A contract requires that two parties agree and thus is not something that one person could accomplish individually. To assert that this is possible “divorces the concept of decision making from any meaningful connection with lived experience.”

 

    This approach to God’s omnipotence divests God of responsibility in the problem of evil. However, it is at the same time problematic. In process thought, the future is open to the realm of possibilities. It is not mechanistically controlled or foreordained by a despot deity. In the universe, there is real freedom for real creativity to emerge and manifest itself in real love. However, this universe contains real and profound risk, and as history has shown, has manifested itself in concrete radical evil and suffering. Process thought affirms the idea of this as a true tragedy and a true tragedy for God himself. But what hope is there that affairs might turn out better than they are now? What hope is there that humanity will embrace God’s creative leadings? It would seem that the history of the world so far and the universal state of suffering leaves the future with dismal prospects. We are left with two “silver linings” on this cloud: (1) the creatures, despite their suffering, contribute in a meaningful way to God through their objective immortality in his memory and (2) God has “an inexhaustible capacity to bring order from chaos and make fresh beginnings.”

 

    Do either of these responses work? The first seems to be minimally meaningful with the second simply not true. Of what comfort is it to a person undergoing either violent abuse or meaningless monotony to know that their life will end in ruin but will be remembered by God? Perhaps there is solace in God’s identification with the sufferer, but still does not seem to be hopeful. The second response seems to be untrue. If God cannot exert any “coercive” power over the world, but can only suggest and pursuade along the lines of his “initial aims,” how does he have “an inexhaustible capacity to bring order from chaos and make fresh beginnings?” It seems like he would only have the capacity to suggest that order come from chaos, but not actually be able to bring it about. Likewise, he could open the possibilities for “fresh beginnings”, but all of these possibilities would have to include prehensions of the past, hence never really being “fresh.” I believe that the Trinitarian concept of the Lordship of Jesus constituted in his resurrection from the dead (Rom. 1.4; Eph. 1.19ff.; Acts 2.24-36; Rev. 5; etc.) overcomes the negative connotations of coercive power in classical conceptions of deity and the impotence of the process theistic god that leaves the world bereft of true hope. Jesus is lord as the lord of life, the lord of the resurrection, and hence is the locus of entrance for humanity to be liberated from the powers of sin and death and participate in the true transfiguring and eternal “yes to life.” The very constitution of Jesus’ lordship ensures that it is understood primarily as a liberating force. Furthermore, a Trinitarian context of divine lordship, as it is shared among the divine persons (cf. 1 Cor. 15.24-28) shows that the kingdom of God bears a primarily relational mark. It seems that the Scriptural resources at hand lend themselves to a superior alternative to both the classical model of God (according to Augustine or Aquinas) and process thought. Process thought has a lot to contribute to discussions on the doctrine of God and the problem of evil, though standing alone their solutions seem problematic. Many of the goals of process thought seem to be accomplished in a superior manner through revised orthodox Christian ideas modified in light of reading the Scripture with a fresh perspective. Robust Biblical doctrines of the trinity and the resurrection lay the foundation for an understanding of reality that is relational, creative, liberating and hopeful.